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Diversity and Ethics: Toward an Objective Business 
Compliance Function 
Steven A. Ramirez* 
This Article builds upon prior works which articulate an objective 
standard for corporate ethics and compliance that furthers shareholder 
wealth maximization: A firm should only engage in conduct that 
acclimates itself as optimally as possible to the full range of its 
constituencies, including investors, workers, consumers, and regulators. 
Further, because of the deep racial and social divisions within the United 
States today (and present in most business environments), a firm can 
achieve optimal acclimation only if it includes the full range of cultural 
diversity within its constituencies, as those diverse voices influence the 
behavior of the firm. This allows the firm to import the conscience of 
those constituencies due to differences in ethical sensitivities among 
discrete segments of the population. This Article argues in favor of an 
SEC disclosure guidance release requiring the disclosure of ethical and 
compliance governance structures and practices. Such a disclosure 
mandate should include: disclosure of governance structures at the board 
level and below; the role of cultural diversity in the ethics and compliance 
function; the degree to which the ethics and compliance function is 
independent of senior management; and how reports of potential 
misconduct are encouraged. These facts would be material to a 
reasonable investor given the history of shareholder losses (particularly 
in recent history) suffered at the hands of unethical and non-compliant 
management. This disclosure mandate could trigger a competitive race-
to-the-top as firms search for those ethical and compliance practices that 
lead to the highest gains in sustainable financial performance. In short, 
competitive capitalism can lead to a race-to-the-top, in terms of ethicality 
and compliance practices, as well as a firm’s embrace of cultural 
diversity. The Article concludes that financial market competition can 
thereby foster superior financial performance, superior management of 
ethical and compliance risk, and superior embrace of cultural diversity 
 
* Steven A. Ramirez is a Professor of Law and Director of the Business Law Center at Loyola 
University Chicago School of Law. 
582 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
all at once. This would further secure investment within the American 
economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Once again,1 large publicly traded firms, particularly large bank 
holding companies, face regulatory sanctions for tolerating criminality 
and blatant unethical misconduct within their business.2 In the fall of 
2016, regulators announced that Wells Fargo incentivized its workers to 
systematically create fake accounts for bonuses and levied large fines 
against the megabank.3 Wells Fargo shareholders ultimately paid 
hundreds of millions of dollars to meet claims arising from management’s 
wrongdoing.4 Further, in the weeks following the announcement of the 
scandal and the settlement with regulators, shareholders lost $25 billion 
 
1. Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity, Compliance, Ethics & In-House Counsel, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 
465, 465–67 (2017) (recounting the silence of the lawyers during massive crises in corporate ethics 
and compliance during the savings and loan crisis, the Enron frauds, and the subprime debacle, and 
proposing a means for achieving greater diligence of counsel in reporting material legal risks to 
senior management and beyond). 
2. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Fines Wells 
Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized Accounts, 
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-
protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-opening-
unauthorized-accounts/. 
3. Id. Later, Wells Fargo revealed it created a total of 3.5 million accounts in order to enhance 
its fee income. Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Uncovers up to 1.4 Million More Fake Accounts, 
CNNMONEY (Aug. 31, 2017, 12:34 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/31/investing/wells-fargo-
fake-accounts/index.html. 
4. See James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo’s $142-million Sham Accounts Settlement: What you 
Need to Know, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2017, 2:44 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-
fargo-settlement-20170710-htmlstory.html (addressing the practical ramifications of both the $142 
million in shareholder wealth paid to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and 
management’s squandering of more corporate resources to settle claims brought against the firm 
by aggrieved customers); see also Patrick Rucker & Dan Freed, Wells Fargo will Pay $190 mln to 
Settle Customer Fraud Case, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/wells-
fargo-settlement/wells-fargo-will-pay-190-mln-to-settle-customer-fraud-case-idUSL1N1BK1E8 
(detailing the May 2015 allegations against Wells Fargo bank and the subsequent settlement in 
which Wells Fargo paid $185 million in penalties and $5 million to customers allegedly pushed 
into fee-generating accounts absent a request). 
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in market capitalization.5 The Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of Wells 
Fargo, on the other hand, garnered a total of $192 million during his 
tenure as CEO.6 The recent ethical and compliance stumbles at Wells 
Fargo illustrate a key point regarding business leadership and corporate 
governance in the United States.7 
Too often the behavior of business leaders in America renders the term 
“business ethics” an oxymoron that seems inconsistent with financial 
success.8 Classes in business ethics similarly encourage students to think 
about ways to maximize short-term windfalls, ethics be damned.9 The 
 
5. Narottam Medhora, Wells Fargo Hit with Class Action Lawsuit over Sales Practices, 
REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/wells-fargo-accounts-lawsuit/wells-
fargo-hit-with-class-action-lawsuit-over-sales-practices-idUSL2N1C30JS (“[S]hares of the 
company have fallen more than 10 percent since Sept. 8 when it reached a settlement with 
regulators, wiping off more than $25 billion of market capitalization.”). Ultimately, the Federal 
Reserve Board imposed further sanctions (including a major board shakeup), triggering a further 6 
percent decline in share value. Evelyn Chang, Wells Fargo Shares Dive after Fed Restricts Bank's 
Growth, Citing 'Consumer Abuses,' CNBC (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/02/federal-reserve-orders-wells-fargo-to-replace-four-board-
members-restricts-growth-because-consumer-abuses.html. 
6. Martha C. White, $41 Million is Chicken Scratch Compared to What Stumpf Earned at Wells 
Fargo, NBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:31 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-
news/41-million-chicken-scratch-compared-what-stumpf-earned-wells-fargo-n656901. 
7. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns 
and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. REG. 257, 276 (2010) (finding that the top executives of two 
firms where shareholders suffered devastating losses achieved “decidedly positive” net payoffs 
from their leadership of the firms during 2000–2008). 
8. A young MBA student surveyed about what she learned about business ethics in America 
from a business ethics class said it made her “wonder if there is not on [sic] single ethical person 
left in corporate America.” Walter Pavlo, An MBA’s View Of The State Of Business Ethics In 
America, FORBES (Jan. 14, 2014, 7:31 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2014/01/14/an-mbas-view-of-the-state-of-business-
ethics-in-america/#3cf130bf3d48 (“I am concerned that MBAs, like myself, will find new ways to 
embezzle, insider trade, and commit crimes to further our own careers. Sadly, applications like 
Snapchat, which deletes text messages once they are read, would be an excellent tool for insider 
trading.”). 
9. We all want to be successful; I am not exempt from the idea of making as much money as 
possible in a shortest amount of time. However, I am more interested in finding solutions to 
ethical dilemmas rather than crossing an ethical line to better any corporation. At the end of 
the day, my perception of the state of ethics in American business is that it is trucking along 
in the same fashion as it has for decades and we MBAs are eager to slip into it. While 
reducing crimes associated with unethical behavior is a worthwhile goal, I’m not sure that I 
will see it reached in my time. Get ready white-collar defense attorneys, you’re bound to 
have your hands full. Id. 
Such attitudes among students should invite educators to remind their classes that while 
accountability for corporate elites faced much dilution under law in the past few years, many 
corporate executives nevertheless suffered incarceration and ignominy for such wrongdoing, 
including Aaron Beam, the founder and former CEO of Health-South (and Special Presenter at the 
2017 Institute for Investor Protection conference). See Quentin Fottrell, Aaron Beam: ‘I think my 
dog still loves me,’ MARKETWATCH (2014), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/aaron-beam-he-
fueled-the-scandal-at-healthsouth-2014-07-29 (analyzing the motivations and repercussions of 
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systematic breakdowns in ethical and compliance standards drove all 
aspects10 of the Great Financial Crisis of 200811 and cost society trillions 
in lost output, highlighting the dismal state of business ethics in America 
today.12 The lack of accountability following the crisis, which 
improbably permitted every CEO at every major Wall Street bank to 
escape criminal or financial liability, hardly suggests that ethical concerns 
are isolated; rather, the pervasive lack of ethical conduct presents a major 
threat to the American economy.13 
 
employing questionable ethics in business). 
10. According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: 
We conclude there was a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics. The integrity 
of our financial markets and the public’s trust in those markets are essential to the 
economic well-being of our nation. The soundness and the sustained prosperity of the 
financial system and our economy rely on the notions of fair dealing, responsibility, and 
transparency. In our economy, we expect businesses and individuals to pursue profits, at 
the same time that they produce products and services of quality and conduct themselves 
well. Unfortunately—as has been the case in past speculative booms and busts—we 
witnessed an erosion of standards of responsibility and ethics that exacerbated the 
financial crisis. 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xxii (2011). Perhaps most disturbing, a manifest attitude of making 
quick money infected Wall Street in the lead-up to the crisis: 
On Wall Street, where many of these loans were packaged into securities and sold to 
investors around the globe, a new term was coined: IBGYBG, “I’ll be gone, you’ll be 
gone.” It referred to deals that brought in big fees up front while risking much larger 
losses in the future. And, for a long time, IBGYBG worked at every level. 
Id. at 8. 
11. Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 707 n.251 (2014) [hereinafter Ramirez, 
Virtues of Private Securities Litigation] (explaining that “the term ‘Great Financial Crisis of 2008’ 
[denotes] the massive global financial market disruption that commenced with the failure of 
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and ending in the spring of 2009 when the U.S. stock 
market hit a low of below 7000 in the Dow Jones Industrial Average” in accordance with the 
recognition of two former Federal Reserve chiefs that this crisis inflicted “unprecedented virulence” 
on the American financial system). 
12. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO–13–180, FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND 
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 17 (Jan. 2013) (detailing the utility of studies that 
estimate output losses to show the rough magnitude of the overall costs associated with the 2007–
2009 financial crisis, which cumulatively could exceed $13 trillion). By any reckoning, the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2008–2009 was a multi-trillion-dollar catastrophe. See Tyler Atkinson et al., 
How Bad Was It? The Costs and Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis, 20 FED. RES. 
BANK OF DALL.: STAFF PAPERS 1–2, 19 (2013), 
https://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1301.pdf (estimating the total cost of the 
crisis in the United States alone at up to $14 trillion and suggesting that the trajectory of potential 
GDP may be permanently lower). 
13. MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH 
PENALTY 1–27 (2016) (reviewing evidence of fraud and the many laws designed to punish fraud 
and concluding that “a new and unprecedented lawlessness emerged at the apex of American 
capitalism”). 
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Shareholders do not benefit from the ethical and compliance lapses at 
their firms.14 On the contrary, shareholders foot the bill at the most 
egregiously miscreant firms, to the exclusion of the managers actually 
orchestrating unethical and non-compliant misconduct.15 In case after 
case, managers walked off with windfall options compensation,16 
generous retirement payments,17 and golden parachute payments (if, in 
rare circumstances, fired).18 Yet shareholders, particularly at the firms at 
the center of the Great Financial Crisis, suffered share price losses and 
the burden of paying off regulators for the misconduct of managers.19 
This reality holds true even today, ten years after the financial crisis.20 
In 2017, I argued for an ethics screening body within firms that 
mirrored the ethical sensitivities of the firm’s key constituencies through 
 
14. Id. at 2–3 (noting the payment of $16.65 billion paid to settle fraud allegations against Bank 
of America, $13 billion paid to settle such allegations against JP Morgan, and $7 billion paid to 
settle claims against Citigroup). 
15. Id. at 7 (stating that while the government fined the megabanks for the sale of billions of 
toxic mortgages without full disclosure to the investors, “the government simply accepted fines that 
essentially punished innocent shareholders instead of senior leaders at the megabanks”). 
16. Id. at 122–23 (“[O]verall the senior officers garnered $1 billion in total compensation 
between 2000 and 2008. The structure of options compensation meant that Lehman’s senior 
managers faced constant incentives to push short-term stock prices as high as possible as their 
options vested over time.”). The shareholders that Lehman’s officers duped into thinking the firm 
enjoyed high liquidity and financial stability suffered a total loss of their investment when the firm 
filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 109–11, 132. 
17. Thus, Stanley O’Neal, the former CEO of Merrill Lynch, stepped down and took a $161.5 
million retirement package with him. O’Neal left behind a doomed company after the firm reported 
a $7.9 billion loss due to aggressive bets in mortgage-backed securities. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, 
Merrill CEO Steps Down, Leaves Firm In Crisis, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/30/AR2007103000565.html. 
18. See, e.g., Claire Suddath, Biggest Golden Parachutes, TIME (2016), 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1848501_1848500_1848461,00.ht
ml (citing to a 2007 emergency board meeting, in which Citigroup Inc.’s Charles Prince announced 
his resignation by saying, “Given the size and nature of the recent losses in our mortgage-backed 
securities business, the only honorable course for me to take as chief executive officer is to step 
down.” He walked away with $99 million in vested stock holdings and a pension, on top of the 
$53.1 million salary and bonuses he racked up during his four-year tenure.). 
19. Citigroup’s shareholders lost 88 percent of their investment over the past ten years. 
Citigroup’s Decade of Agony is Almost Over, ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21718924-recipient-americas-biggest-bank-bail-out-
has-overhauled-its-capital-base-and-its-profits. 
20. JPMorgan alone has paid a total of $36 billion in settlements and fines since 2008. Some 
of the highlights: selling securities constructed from “toxic” mortgages, according to the U.S. 
Department of Justice ($13 billion); failing to report questionable activity by Ponzi schemer 
Bernard Madoff ($1.7 billion); and, most recently, colluding to rig foreign-exchange rates 
($1.9 billion to a host of regulators). 
Anthony Effinger, The Rise of the Compliance Guru—and Banker Ire, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 
2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2015-06-25/compliance-is-now-
calling-the-shots-and-bankers-are-bristling. 
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the importation of the full range of cultural diversity21 within these 
constituencies.22 I advocated that this would effectively import an 
ethicality into the firm that would require more than mere legal 
compliance to maximize shareholder wealth.23 Diversity also imports 
rigor into the firm in that the firm’s conduct must pass muster with all 
culturally diverse perspectives on compliance or ethical issues if diverse 
voices hold sway.24 I focused on the role of in-house counsel in fostering 
this function.25 I further suggested that in-house counsel could implement 
such a screening function to provide additional insulation to counsel 
seeking to further the ethical and compliance efforts of the firm 
 
21. Orlando C. Richard et al., The Impact of Racial Diversity on Intermediate and Long-term 
Performance: The Moderating Role of Environmental Context, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1213, 1229 
(2007) (“Cultural diversity exists when people with distinct and different group affiliations of 
cultural significance are found within a larger group or organization.”). This implies no 
compromise in terms of financial performance. Id. at 1229 (“The delightful discovery is that beyond 
moderate levels of diversity we find a positive effect of racial diversity on both our short-term and 
long-term measures of performance.”). Of course, diversity must be well-managed and tokenism 
must be avoided or diverse perspectives will be squelched. See, e.g., Kimberly M. Ellis & Phyllis 
Y. Keys, Workforce Diversity and Shareholder Value: A Multi-Level Perspective, 44 REV. 
QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 191, 209–10 (2015) (finding enhanced firm value for diverse 
workforces in firms that garner Fortune “Diversity Elite” recognition). When properly 
implemented, enhanced cultural diversity can enhance creativity. See, e.g., Adam D. Galinsky et 
al., Maximizing the Gains and Minimizing the Pains of Diversity, 10 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 742, 
745 (2015) (“The practices of inclusive multiculturalism and perspective taking also help catalyze 
the innovation and decision-making benefits of diversity. For example, organizational climates that 
value diversity increase information processing and exchange and thus produce better decisions. 
Similarly, when team members consider one another’s perspectives, diverse teams are more 
creative.”). 
22. Ramirez, supra note 1, at 466 (“This essay posits that cultural diversity can help in-house 
counsel achieve superior ethical, compliance, and reputation risk management outcomes for their 
firms, and therefore in-house counsel should seek to maximize cultural diversity within the corps 
of corporate counsel representing firms, and throughout the firm.”). 
23. [E]nhanced cultural diversity embedded in a screening function within the firm, that is 
armed with the tools for a heterogeneous assessment of the most dubious firm practices, 
provides the firm with an objective and rigorous basis for determining the ethicality and costs 
of a given practice or course of conduct. 
Id. at 483. 
24. Basing the acclimation of the firm to cultural diversity should also operate to provide 
the firm with a standard of ethicality more rigorous than the definition of ethicality that 
has too often prevailed in the past.” Cultural diversity would subject a proposed course 
of conduct to additional ethics screens based upon “the ethics sensitivities of women and 
different ethnic groups. 
Id. at 479. 
25. Id. at 481 (using a robust and culturally diverse group to vet the “ethicality or compliance 
repercussions of a given business practice would . . . shield an in-house attorney from much more 
patent risks and career threats in being forced to blow the whistle alone, without the support of 
other culturally diverse voices”). Possible termination for whistleblowing may account in part for 
the silence of the lawyers with respect to the fraud and unethical behavior underlying corporate 
scandals such as the subprime debacle. Id. at 465. 
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notwithstanding possible managerial resistance.26 Earlier, in 2010, I 
posited that optimal legal risk management should not be siloed in the 
CEO, and that an independent committee of the board with legal expertise 
and an anonymous reporting function would prove superior to the proven 
flaws of CEO autonomy regarding legal, compliance, and reputational 
(i.e., ethical) risk management.27 This Article extends these proposals and 
concepts into the realm of investor protection under the federal securities 
laws.28 
More specifically, this Article argues that investors deserve to know 
the contours of a firm’s compliance and ethical governance when making 
investment decisions.29 While courts traditionally deem management 
integrity not material under the federal securities laws, and therefore not 
subject to mandatory disclosure, telling the truth about ethical governance 
systems is not the same as telling the truth about managerial corruption 
or ethicality.30 Thus, for example, Congress required disclosure of the 
 
26. Id. at 465–67 (“This essay suggests that in-house counsel interested in protecting 
shareholders from the costs of misconduct within their firms, however, can take proactive steps to 
protect shareholders from the kind of skullduggery that drove all aspects of the subprime crisis, as 
well as the Enron series of frauds.”). The use of a culturally diverse screening function could 
operate to short-circuit dubious conduct prior to the need of counsel to consider reporting the 
misconduct under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 1.6, 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
27. Steven A. Ramirez, Legal Risk Post-SOX and the Subprime Fiasco: Back to the Drawing 
Board, in ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 351–67 (John Fraser & Betty J. Simkins eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board]. 
28. This Article will focus upon the mandatory disclosure regime under the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–22, 48 Stat. 
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 
404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2012)). 
29. The existence of an ethics code, or an explanation why a firm lacks one, is already disclosed as 
a material fact: 
Pursuant to [the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002] section 406(a), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued regulations requiring each public company to 
disclose whether it has a code of ethics, and if a company has not adopted such a code, 
to explain why it has chosen not to do so. SEC rules also require each company that has 
a code to disclose any waiver of the code, as applied to corporate officers that the SEC 
rules identify, in a timely manner under Item 5.05 of Form 8-K. 
Madoka Mori, A Proposal to Revise the SEC Instructions for Reporting Waivers of Corporate 
Codes of Ethics for Conflicts of Interest, 24 YALE J. REG. 293, 293 (2007). 
30. In 1976, the United States Supreme Court defined a “material” fact as one that would be 
“viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.” Despite the definition, there were no pressures from investors 
for corporate disclosure of unadjudicated violations of law or antisocial conduct, or for 
ethical or moral behavior at the corporate level. 
John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable 
Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 42 (1998) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976)). See MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & JOHN M. WUNDERLICH, RULE 10B-5 PRIVATE 
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION 869–80 (2015) (citing to numerous cases holding that management 
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existence of codes of ethics in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act after the massive 
securities frauds of 2001 and 2003, including the collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom.31 Disclosure of ethical and compliance governance systems, 
including the role of cultural diversity within those systems, would 
encourage firms to compete for capital on the basis of their governance 
of compliance and ethics risks.32 
Businesses that use cultural diversity to screen their business conduct 
within the framework of a well-ordered scheme of shareholder wealth 
maximization will better acclimate themselves to all key constituencies, 
leading to superior financial performance.33 Given the increased diversity 
of consumer, labor, and investor pools, this approach to encouraging 
extra-legal standards of conduct draws upon differences in ethical 
sensitivities to drive more rigorous ethical and compliance screening of 
business conduct.34 Further, to the extent the business enterprise 
enhances its financial performance through a more diverse screening 
 
integrity and ethicality cannot form the basis for a private securities fraud action under Rule 10b-5 
because such facts are not material). 
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, § 406, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 7264) (requiring the SEC to issue rules requiring publicly traded firms to “disclose 
whether or not, and if not, the reason therefor, such issuer has adopted a code of ethics for senior 
financial officers, applicable to its principal financial officer and comptroller or principal 
accounting officer, or persons performing similar functions”). 
32. Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, and the Market for 
Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 287–94 (2005) (suggesting that firms could “compete on the 
basis of ethical commitments” when investors can weigh differing approaches to ethics). The SEC 
took a similar approach when it used its power under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to create the Qualified 
Legal Compliance Committee (“QLCC”). Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 27, at 
351 (stating that while the QLCC innovation encouraged firms to centralize legal compliance in 
the hands of an independent board committee, few public firms took advantage of this innovation). 
33. Maretno Harjoto et al., Board Diversity and Corporate Social Responsibility, 132 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 641, 642 (2015) (“Firms could suffer both monetary and reputational losses from failing to 
align management’s interests with those of their stakeholders. Effective stakeholder management 
is a critical requirement for firm success.”). See also id. (indicating that group dynamics and 
decisionmaking vary depending on the background of the individuals serving on corporate boards, 
and thus, a diverse group of directors brings different knowledge bases, sets of experiences, and 
perspectives on society to group decisionmaking; as a result, diversity increases the board’s ability 
to recognize the needs and interests of different groups of stakeholders as reflected in CSR 
performance). 
34. Social scientists theorize that women and ethnic minorities approach ethics and risk 
differently based upon cultural socialization. See Leslie Dawson, Ethical Differences Between Men 
and Women in the Sales Profession, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1143, 1143–44 (1997) (“This theory holds 
that general and nearly universal differences that characterize masculine and feminine personalities 
are formed in childhood and are incontrovertible; these in turn differentially shape the work-related 
interests, concerns, and values of the sexes.”); Melissa L. Finucane et al., Gender, Race, and 
Perceived Risk: The “White Male” Effect, 2 HEALTH, RISK & SOC’Y 159, 169 (2000) (reporting 
that survey data did not support any biological explanation for diverse risk perceptions because 
differences between men and women in risk perception differed across races); id. at 170 
(concluding that the differences were likely driven by socialization effects). 
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mechanism, it should lead to quantifiable gains over those firms that do 
not feature such an innovation. Ultimately, the optimal structure for 
corporate ethical screening should emerge to give shareholders enhanced 
value as the firm achieves greater acclimation among constituencies. 
Competitive pressure can thereby enhance firm ethicality and investors 
can thereby objectively measure firm ethicality. The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should facilitate this process of market 
discovery of optimal ethical and compliance structures within the firm 
through the issuance of disclosure guidance of ethical and compliance 
structures within public firms.35 Such structures will prove material to 
investors. 
Part I will review recent ethical and compliance lapses and will 
demonstrate the materiality of such lapses to shareholders who typically 
suffer significant investment losses in the wake of disclosure of ethical 
and compliance lapses. Part II will suggest keys to achieving superior 
ethical and compliance outcomes through the firm-wide embrace of 
cultural diversity, and the degree to which that diversity plays a role in 
ethical and compliance risk management. Part III will argue that internal 
governance mechanisms and structures relating to ethics and compliance 
are material, and that the SEC should facilitate market movement toward 
more optimal internal firm structures through appropriate disclosure 
guidance beyond current ethics-related disclosures. The Article will 
conclude that embedding cultural diversity within a well-structured 
system of governance will yield objectively measurable positive 
outcomes in financial performance. As such, firms will be able to 
demonstrate an ethics and compliance advantage, and ultimately compete 
to perfect that advantage. 
I.  THE MATERIALITY OF ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE 
In the current political environment, ethics and compliance systems 
within public firms likely will take on increased significance. The Trump 
administration posits that deregulation will lead to greater economic 
growth.36 Nevertheless, the administration’s approach relies upon 
 
35. As such, this proposed reform is a pro-market reform, simply requiring disclosure of facts 
that otherwise may not easily be known to market participants but that are nevertheless material. 
Simply put, it should enhance market efficiency while at the same time encouraging managers to 
attend to ethics and compliance more aggressively than in the past. See Allen Ferrell, The Case for 
Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. 
L. 81, 125 (2007) (“[T]here are again strong theoretical reasons, backed by an impressive body of 
empirical evidence, that mandatory disclosure can have the socially desirable effect of increasing 
competition between firms for capital and competition in the product market.”). 
36. An Assessment of the White House’s Progress on Deregulation, ECONOMIST (Oct. 17, 2017) 
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21730170-donald-trump-has-blocked-new-
590 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  49 
irrational and arbitrary factors not conducive to rational regulation, but 
instead focused on empowering the corporate class.37 The administration 
directed the government to forsake any semblance of rational cost-benefit 
analysis in favor of a regulatory approach that completely ignores any 
regulatory benefits and focuses only upon costs to business to foreclose 
regulation.38 Worse, any rule passing the first irrational requirement can 
only become effective upon the irrational requirement that two other 
regulations face repeal.39 The government must now disregard massive 
economic benefits of rational regulation in vital areas such as 
environmental protection, transportation, and energy.40 These 
requirements essentially slowed regulatory rulemaking to a crawl not 
seen since 2007, immediately preceding the Great Financial Crisis.41 
Further, more deregulation appears likely. The U.S. House of 
Representatives already voted to partially repeal the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),42 and 
the Trump administration released its own plan to repeal parts of the 
Dodd-Frank Act in October 2017.43 The Dodd-Frank Act encapsulates 
 
regulations-ease-repealing-old-ones-will-be-harder (“Deregulation, along with tax cuts and trade 
reform, is one of the three pillars of President Donald Trump’s economic agenda. Republicans 
promise that, freed of red tape, American firms will invest more and unleash faster economic 
growth.”). 
37. Mr. Trump has slowed rulemaking in two main ways. First, on coming to office, he ordered 
government agencies not to impose any net new regulatory costs on companies, regardless 
of the benefits of doing so, and said that in order to write any new rules they would have to 
repeal two old ones. Because it takes time to unearth and discard dud rules, the practical 
effect of this has been to put a brake on new issuance. Id. 
38. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017) (“[T]he heads of all agencies are 
directed that the total incremental cost of all new regulations . . . to be finalized this year shall be 
no greater than zero, unless otherwise required by law or consistent with advice provided in writing 
by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.”). 
39. Id. (“Unless prohibited by law, whenever an executive department or agency (agency) 
publicly proposes for notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall 
identify at least two existing regulations to be repealed.”). 
40. ECONOMIST, supra note 36, at fig. 2. 
41. How to Judge Whether Deregulation is Going Too Far, ECONOMIST (Oct. 12, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21730148-donald-trumps-regulatory-policy-strange-
mix-thoughtful-and-dangerous-how-judge-whether (“Even diehard libertarians should worry when 
the administration weakens rules governing the leaching of coal ash into groundwater, or permits 
the use of pesticides that may impair children’s brain development.”). 
42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5581). 
43. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC 
OPPORTUNITIES: CAPITAL MARKETS: REPORT TO PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP 205–20 (Oct. 
2017) https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-
Capital-Markets-FINAL-FINAL.pdf (“Treasury recommends that Section 1502 (conflict 
minerals), Section 1503 (mine safety), Section 1504 (resource extraction), and Section 953(b) (pay 
ratio) of Dodd-Frank be repealed and any rules issued pursuant to such provisions be withdrawn.”). 
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the primary regulatory response of the U.S. government to the massive 
wealth destruction investors faced after the Great Financial Crisis of 
2008.44 It reaches a range of troublesome and complex regulatory topics, 
from derivatives45 to executive compensation,46 and from too-big-to-fail 
banks47 to diversity in the financial sector.48 While the Dodd-Frank Act 
certainly inspired criticism from across the political spectrum,49 it has 
undisputedly prevented a recurrence of the Great Financial Crisis.50 
Economic history suggests that sustainable economic growth requires 
a sound legal and regulatory infrastructure that lowers the cost of capital 
or raises the returns to capital, including the stabilization of the economy 
through appropriate regulation, particularly in the financial sector.51 Even 
the staunch conservative scholar and jurist Richard Posner admitted in 
 
44. Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109, 110 (2011) 
(assessing the Dodd-Frank Act as the primary government response to the Great Financial Crisis 
and concluding that “while Dodd-Frank may prevent another subprime crisis, it will prove unable 
to prevent a future, more serious debt crisis”). 
45. Timothy E. Lynch, Coming Up Short: The United States’ Second-Best Strategies for 
Corralling Purely Speculative Derivatives, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 545, 549 (2014) (arguing that 
purely speculative derivative trades are still permitted under Dodd-Frank despite their negative 
externalities and the fact that they constitute negative sum transactions and serve no rational 
purpose). 
46. Securities Regulation – Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1144, 1145–46 (2016) (assessing possible attack on SEC rule mandating disclosure 
of executive pay ratio which took effect on January 1, 2017, in the following regulation: 80 Fed. 
Reg. 50, 104 (Aug. 18, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249)). 
47. H. Rodgin Cohen, Preventing the Fire Next Time: Too Big to Fail, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1717, 
1722 (2012) (“TBTF [Too Big to Fail] is an unacceptable policy that must be ended by legislative 
reform. This policy creates moral hazard; it produces marketplace distortions; it is inequitable; and, 
of most importance, it represents a potential call option on the taxpayer.”). 
48. See Kristin Johnson et al., Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd-Frank Section 342 Help 
Stabilize the Financial Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 1867 (2016) (concluding that 
Congress acted appropriately in seeking to diversify the financial sector). 
49. See Ben Portiss, Is Dodd-Frank Overdue or Overkill? 2 Dueling Views, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
3, 2011, 4:20 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/is-dodd-frank-overdue-or-overkill-2-
dueling-views/ (quoting Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz for the proposition that Dodd-Frank “went 
nowhere far enough” and quoting former Comptroller of the Currency Edward Ludwig for the 
proposition that the Act is “a deleterious drag on capital formation and meaningful job opportunities 
for our people”). 
50. See Ben McLannahan, Did Dodd-Frank Really Hurt the US Economy?, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 
13, 2017) https://www.ft.com/content/dd4a6698-efe7-11e6-930f-061b01e23655 (showing that 
bank lending expanded, and banks increased capital and profits, since the enactment of Dodd-
Frank); John W. Schoen, Despite Critics’ Claims, Dodd-Frank Hasn’t Slowed Lending to Business 
or Consumers, CNBC (Feb. 6, 2017, 2:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/06/despite-critics-
claims-dodd-frank-hasnt-slowed-lending-to-business-or-consumers.html (showing that bank 
lending increased after the enactment of Dodd-Frank). 
51. Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Macroeconomics of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 
515, 546 (2003) (showing that the Great Depression necessitated new financial regulations such as 
the federal securities laws and inaugurated a search “to endow our economy with . . . an optimized 
regulatory infrastructure”). 
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2009 that, 
the depression [following the Great Financial Crisis] has shown that we 
need a more active and intelligent government to keep our model of a 
capitalist economy from running off the rails. The movement to 
deregulate the financial industry went too far by exaggerating the 
resilience—the self-healing powers—of laissez-faire capitalism.52 
The pre-Dodd-Frank regulatory environment hardly offered adequate 
investor protection to shareholders and other securities investors.53 
Worldwide, equity markets got hammered when all of the losses 
underlying the subprime debacle came to light.54 All of this suggests that 
further deregulation enhances the risks of another calamity like the Great 
Financial Crisis stemming from unethical and unlawful misconduct. 
The staggering shareholder losses associated with egregious failures in 
ethics and compliance risk management also manifest themselves at the 
firm level. The shareholders of Wells Fargo certainly can attest to the 
devastating consequences of systematically sanctioned ethical and 
compliance breaches.55 Indeed, the entire megabank sector worldwide, 
which suffers from a pervasive lack of accountability and the most 
promiscuous government subsidies,56 spends billions in shareholder 
 
52. Robert M. Solow, How to Understand the Disaster, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 14, 2009) 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/05/14/how-to-understand-the-disaster/ (book review of 
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ‘08 AND THE DESCENT INTO 
DEPRESSION 75 (2009)) (stating that Posner is an independent thinker but “his independent thoughts 
have usually led him to a position well to the right of the political economy spectrum” and “his 
thought exhibits an affinity to Chicago school economics: libertarian, monetarist, sensitive to even 
small matters of economic efficiency, dismissive of large matters of equity, and therefore protective 
of property rights even at the expense of larger and softer ‘human’ rights”). 
53. Ramirez, Virtues of Private Securities Litigation, supra note 11, at 735 (demonstrating that 
the Great Financial Crisis arose from massive securities fraud against investors in mortgage-backed 
securities and firms exposed to such securities). Due to sustained attacks on the rights of investors 
to privately enforce the federal securities laws, the law failed to adequately deter securities fraud. 
Id. at 736–37. 
54. Söhnke M. Bartram & Gordon M. Bodnar, No Place to Hide: The Global Crisis in Equity 
Markets in 2008/2009, 28 J. INT'L MONEY & FIN. 1246, 1246 (2009) (“[L]ooking at return 
performance across an array of regions, countries, and sectors, broad [equity] market averages are 
down approximately 40% on their end of 2006 levels.”). 
55. See supra notes 2–5. 
56. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., There’s No Such Thing as a ‘Good’ Megabank, AM. BANKER (Nov. 
22, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-good-
megabank (“Giant financial conglomerates were at the epicenter of the global financial crisis. The 
U.S., United Kingdom and European Union provided more than $10 trillion of capital infusions, 
guarantees and emergency loans to stabilize their financial systems and rescue failing 
megabanks. . . .”). Professor Wilmarth suggests that the huge subsidies behind the megabanks fuel 
an inherent moral hazard that arises when risky conduct enjoys government funding: 
“megabanks . . . finance their speculative activities in the capital markets by exploiting explicit and 
implicit federal safety net subsidies. To expect managers and regulators to produce ‘good’ 
megabanks is to ignore the lessons of history and fundamental laws of human nature.” Id. 
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wealth to pay regulatory fines in a way that simply reflects that systematic 
unethical and unlawful conduct remains a part of the megabank business 
model.57 Even beyond the megabanks, however, public firms regularly 
destroy massive amounts of shareholder wealth from ethically dubious 
conduct. 
Consider the recent data breach uncovered at Equifax that affected up 
to 143 million Americans.58 Hackers gained access to consumer 
information, including names, addresses, dates of birth, and Social 
Security numbers.59 After Equifax announced the breach, on September 
7, 2017, its stock plunged 30 percent, wiping out $6 billion in shareholder 
wealth in just ten days.60 Management first heard hints of trouble on 
March 8, 2017, and definitely knew they faced serious problems on 
August 22, 2017.61 Yet, the company allowed the security problems to 
fester, and, as always, shareholders were the last to learn of 
management’s recklessness.62 The CEO of Equifax resigned after the 
breach with a reported total payout of over $90 million.63 
Or, consider the so-called “Dieselgate” scandal that rocked 
shareholders of Volkswagen across the world in 2015.64 In fact, investors 
are calling for the firm’s break-up to unlock the value that is currently 
mired in scandal.65 The company installed software on its diesel engines 
that could sense an emissions test and reduce emissions to pass the test 
even while spewing unlawful pollution otherwise.66 The company 
expended over $26 billion to meet liabilities arising from the scam.67 
 
57. Gavin Finch, World’s Biggest Banks Fined $321 Billion Since Financial Crisis, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2017, 11:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-
02/world-s-biggest-banks-fined-321-billion-since-financial-crisis (“Banks globally have paid $321 
billion in fines since 2008 for an abundance of regulatory failings from money laundering to market 
manipulation and terrorist financing, according to data from Boston Consulting Group.”). In 2015, 
the entire megabank sector worldwide consisting of over 300 large banks posted an economic profit 
of $167 billion. Id. During the entire period of 2009–2015 the sector posted negative economic 
profit. Id. 
58. AnnaMaria Andriotis et al., ‘We’ve Been Breached’: Inside the Equifax Hack, WALL 
STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/weve-been-breached-inside-
the-equifax-hack-1505693318?mg=prod/accounts-wsj. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. See id. 
63. Jen Wieczner, Equifax CEO Richard Smith Who Oversaw Breach to Collect $90 Million, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 26, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/09/26/equifax-ceo-richard-smith-net-worth/. 
64. Andrew Bary, Volkswagen’s Road to Recovery, BARRON’S (Aug. 12, 2017, 1:08 AM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/volkswagens-road-to-recovery-1502513470 (noting that 
Volkswagen shares trade in the U.S. and Germany). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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Shareholders suffered deep losses as a result of the scandal and shares 
still trade at a deep discount to their value prior to the disclosure of the 
scandal.68 
The next great wave of corporate scandals may well dwarf the above 
scandals and even the subprime debacle. ExxonMobil and other carbon 
producers appear to have undertaken a concerted effort to hide the truth 
about climate change in the name of short-term profits from underpriced 
carbon.69 The pharmaceutical industry may well face legal and regulatory 
sanctions from their role in hyper-peddling addictive opioids.70 
Eventually, shareholders face the costs of these undisclosed risks even if 
the short-term profits may initially fatten shareholder wallets.71 By 
 
68. Gilbert Kreijger, How VW Rose So High and Fell So Low, HANDELSBLATT GLOBAL (June 
23, 2017, 2:59 PM), https://global.handelsblatt.com/companies-markets/how-vw-rose-so-high-
and-fell-so-low-volkswagen-history-dieselgate-emissions-fraud-porsche-hitler-784792 
(“‘Dieselgate’ is now the biggest case of fraud in automotive history. It has cost VW €21.6 billion 
so far, triggered hundreds of lawsuits and wiped out a fifth of VW’s preference stock value.”). 
69. For example, scholars studied ExxonMobile’s scientific knowledge of the dangers of 
climate change cannot square with their public pronouncements: 
We conclude that ExxonMobil contributed to advancing climate science—by way of its 
scientists’ academic publications—but promoted doubt about it in advertorials. Given 
this discrepancy, we conclude that ExxonMobil misled the public. Our content analysis 
also examines ExxonMobil’s discussion of the risks of stranded fossil fuel assets. We 
find the topic discussed and sometimes quantified in 24 documents of various types, but 
absent from advertorials. 
Geoffrey Supran & Naomi Oreskes, Assessing ExxonMobil’s Climate Change Communications 
(1977–2014), 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2017). 
70. According to 60 Minutes: 
In the midst of the worst drug epidemic in American history, the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Administration’s ability to keep addictive opioids off U.S. streets was derailed—that 
according to Joe Rannazzisi, one of the most important whistleblowers ever interviewed 
by 60 Minutes. Rannazzisi ran the DEA’s Office of Diversion Control, the division that 
regulates and investigates the pharmaceutical industry. Now in a joint investigation by 
60 Minutes and The Washington Post, Rannazzisi tells the inside story of how, he says, 
the opioid crisis was allowed to spread—aided by Congress, lobbyists, and a drug 
distribution industry that shipped, almost unchecked, hundreds of millions of pills to 
rogue pharmacies and pain clinics providing the rocket fuel for a crisis that, over the last 
two decades, has claimed 200,000 lives. 
Bill Whitaker, Ex-DEA Agent: Opioid Crisis Fueled by Drug Industry and Congress, CBS NEWS 
(Oct. 17, 2017, 10:12 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-dea-agent-opioid-crisis-fueled-by-
drug-industry-and-congress/. 
71. Disclosure of the systems in place to assure ethical and compliant conduct would address a 
fundamental information asymmetry with respect to misconduct: management will always know 
about such misconduct before shareholders. See supra notes 62 and 68. Economists Michael 
Spence, Joseph Stiglitz, and George Akerlof won the Nobel Prize in 2001 for showing that under 
conditions of asymmetric information markets cannot reach efficient outcomes. Press Release, 
Nobel Prize, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2001 
(Oct. 10, 2001), https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2001/press.html. Here the reality of asymmetric information means shareholders 
randomly partake in involuntary profits from often reprehensible behavior and randomly face losses 
they cannot avoid. 
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definition, shareholders suffer from inherently asymmetric information 
regarding managerial misconduct at their firms, as management alone 
knows of their own misconduct and trades accordingly. 
Disclosure of ethics and compliance risk-management systems in and 
of itself is not likely to end corporate scandals.72 Much costly, irrational, 
and socially pernicious corporate misconduct appears inherent to the 
corporate form, at least as currently structured.73 Nevertheless, full 
disclosure will at least bring future costs, sanctions, and liabilities 
forward into the present value of firms, and thereby cause firms to reckon 
with their ethical and compliance transparency from a cost of capital 
point of view.74 The next Section will explore the possibility that a fully 
diversified ethics and compliance function may actually curtail such 
wrongdoing. 
II.  DIVERSITY AND ETHICS 
Scholars and other thought leaders have long strived to create objective 
and normative notions of ethicality.75 At the same time, while some level 
of universality pertains to behavioral norms, scholars also generally 
recognize that ethicality carries with it some level of culture-bound notion 
 
72. Unlawful securities fraud seemed under control from a macroeconomic perspective under 
the legal and regulatory infrastructure that existed prior to the enactment of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act in the 1990s, as well as 
prior to judicial hostility to private securities litigation. Ramirez, Virtues of Private Securities 
Litigation, supra note 11, at 677–710 (exploring the effects of modern capitalism, in view of market 
efficiency theory, in which a superior informational foundation to drive investment gives rise to a 
fertile ground for panics leading to major financial panic and collapse). 
73. For example, the effective abolition of liability for damages for breaches of the duty of care 
for directors does not encourage boards that care much about shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (enabling a corporation to amend its articles of incorporation to include 
“[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its 
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as director . . .”); see also Steven 
A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 362 (2006) (“It is difficult to justify the 
obliteration of the duty of care or a CEO-primacy model of corporate governance on economic 
grounds; no empirical evidence suggests that permitting directors to be infinitely negligent is 
economically sound.”). 
74. Appropriate disclosure would force firms to compete for capital through superior ethics and 
compliance systems. 
75. PETER SINGER, ETHICS 3 (1994) (surveying answers offered by great thinkers regarding the 
search for objective norms and concluding that the “ancient quest” if fulfilled would be more 
valuable than any “sacred relic”). Insofar as business ethics is concerned, this Article is premised 
on the notion that firms should strive to optimize their acclimation to all important constituents, 
and that cultural diversity with the firm affords the firm the ability to maximize shareholder through 
such acclimation. See Ramirez, supra note 1, at 479–80 (articulating an approach based upon the 
firm’s manifest need to acclimate itself as positively as possible to the varying perspectives of its 
key constituencies as a means for enabling in-house counsel to guide their firms to superior ethical 
and compliance outcomes). 
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of appropriate conduct.76 In a globalizing economy, business leaders 
must navigate different cultural visions of morality itself.77 This Section 
will argue that, in a paradigm of true shareholder primacy, managers 
should seek to implement and abide by a process that includes and 
empowers the same cultural diversity present in the business’ key 
constituencies (labor, investors, consumers, and regulators) to acclimate 
the firm as optimally as possible to those constituencies for the purpose 
of maximizing shareholder wealth.78 
In the U.S., for example, scholars have shown that different 
acculturation experiences (based, for example, upon gender or ethnic 
differences) lead to different ethical sensitivities.79 In one study, the 
authors found statistically significant differences between men and 
women as well as between the four major ethnic groups present in the 
U.S. regarding responses to a number of ethics-related survey 
questions.80 No group held a monopoly on virtue; instead, different 
groups scored higher on the ethics survey depending on the nature of the 
 
76. Mohamed S. Msoroka & Diana Amundsen, One Size Fits not Quite All: Universal Research 
Ethics with Diversity, RES. ETHICS (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2) (stating that extreme 
cultural relativism would hold that culture is the sole source of a moral right or rule and that extreme 
universalism would hold that culture is irrelevant to morality, but opting for a mediating approach 
between those two radical approaches). Msoroka and Amundsen advocate a fusion of universality 
combined with cultural diversity in the specific context of research involving human subjects: 
“Universality with diversity requires making room within a universal one-size-fits-all ethics 
approach for a deeper consideration of how cultural values and beliefs bear influence on the process 
of ethical deliberation.” Id. at 14. 
77. Domènec Melé & Carlos Sánchez-Runde, Cultural Diversity and Universal Ethics in a 
Global World, 116 J. BUS. ETHICS 681, 682 (2013) (“[T]he statement ‘Polygamy is morally 
wrong,’ . . . may be true relative to one society, but false relative to another. Similar examples could 
include cutting off a hand when someone is caught stealing, the mutilation of female genitals, or in 
a business context, tolerating bribery and harming the environment.”). 
78. Id. (“Moral diversity among cultures is not a novelty. Among the ancient Greek 
philosophers, moral diversity was widely acknowledged, as it was with Medieval thinkers, like 
Thomas Aquinas. Modern cultural anthropologists have also empirically shown that moral diversity 
is a matter of fact.”) (citations omitted). 
79. See, e.g., Costas Hadjicharalambous & Lynn Walsh, Ethnicity/Race and Gender Effects on 
Ethical Sensitivity in Four Sub-Cultures, 15 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 119, 128 (2012) 
(offering an empirical analysis of ethical variations across different racial/ethnic and gender 
groups). 
80. Id. at 128 (“While gender differences were found in 26 of the 30 scenarios, ethnicity/race 
differences, significant at p < 0.05, are observed in only 10 of the 30 scenarios.”). The authors of 
the study noted that the most pronounced differences between African Americans and Caucasians 
were in the area of caring for others, consistent with prior research. Id. (citing Linda A. Jackson et 
al., Gender, Race and Morality in the Virtual World and its Relationship to Morality in the Real 
World, 60 SEX ROLES 859 (2009)). The authors also noted that the finding of statistically significant 
differences between Asian Americans and Caucasians was also consistent with prior research. Id. 
(citing Louis P. White & Melanie J. Rhodeback, Ethical Dilemmas in Organization Development: 
A Cross-Cultural Analysis, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 663 (1992)). 
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ethics inquiry or scenario.81 
Moreover, in considering the differences in ethical sensitivities, the 
differences in risk perceptions across gender and ethnicity play an equally 
important role for business ethics and compliance risk management.82 
Both women and ethnic minorities perceive risk differently from white 
males.83 In fact, social scientists have long studied the “white male 
effect” of risk insensitivity.84 This socially constructed effect appears to 
turn on cultural privilege.85 In the U.S. that translates into higher risk 
aversion in women, ethnic minorities, and more vulnerable white 
males.86 Thus, including women in leadership positions appears to give 
firms an edge in terms of managing financial risks.87 Firms with both 
 
81. See Hadjicharalambous & Walsh, supra note 79, at 127, tbl.6 (illustrating that while no 
single demographic dominated the ethics survey, disparate ethical sensitivities arose between 
different gender and/or ethnic groups). This too is consistent with prior research. See John Tsalikis 
& Osita Nwachukuru, Cross-Cultural Business Ethics: Ethical Beliefs Differences Between Blacks 
and Whites, 7 J. BUS. ETHICS 745, 746, 751, 753 (1988) (investigating the differences in ethical 
beliefs between blacks and whites in the United States in a study involving 234 white students and 
255 black students who exhibited similar ethical beliefs despite reaching  different “probability of 
making the same decision” in two ethical scenarios). 
82. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 465–66 (2007) (“Numerous 
studies show that risk perceptions are skewed across gender and race: women worry more than 
men, and minorities more than whites, about myriad dangers—from environmental pollution to 
hand guns, from blood transfusions to red meat.”); Irwin P. Levin et al., The Interaction of 
Experiential and Situational Factors and Gender in a Simulated Risky Decision-Making Task, 122 
J. PSYCHOL. 173, 180 (1988) (finding that women students were more risk averse than male students 
in an experimental setting). 
83. James Farrell, Demographic and Socioeconomic Factors of Investors, in INVESTOR 
BEHAVIOR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FINANCIAL PLANNING AND INVESTING 117 (H. Kent Baker & 
Victor Ricciardi eds., 2014) (compiling and reviewing empirical studies focusing on the differences 
in investment behavior across race and gender groups). 
84. E.g., James Flynn et al., Gender, Race, and Perception of Environmental Health Risks, 14 
RISK ANALYSIS 1101, 1107 (1994) (“There are two new and important results in these data. First, 
nonwhite males and females are much more similar in their perceptions of risk than are white males 
and females. Second, white males stand out from everyone else in their perceptions and attitudes 
regarding risk.”). 
85. Anna Olofsson & Saman Rashid, The White (Male) Effect and Risk Perception: Can 
Equality Make a Difference?, 31 RISK ANALYSIS 1016, 1029 (2011) (finding that in Sweden (which 
scores high on gender equality) “there is no pure ‘white male effect’ . . . it is just a ‘white effect,’ 
since the white majority shows low risk perception regardless of gender”) (emphasis in original); 
Shahar Sansani, Ethnicity and Risk: A Field Test of the White-Male Effect, 25 ECON. LETTERS 74, 
74 (2018) (finding that dominant social group in Israel took more risk than outgroups consistent 
with the “White-Male Effect,” the notion that white males in the U.S. perceive lower risks than 
females and non-whites). 
86. Terre A. Satterfield et al., Discrimination, Vulnerability, and Justice in the Face of Risk, 24 
RISK ANALYSIS 114, 127 (2004) (“[S]trong (affirmative) feelings of discrimination and 
vulnerability and evaluative judgments of justice, as well as strong support for environmental 
injustice claims, are closely linked to high perceptions of environmental health risks.”). 
87. See Thorsten Beck et al., Gender and Banking: Are Women Better Loan Officers?, 17 REV. 
FIN. 1279, 1317 (2013) (finding female loan officers have fewer problematic loans); Maureen I. 
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women and minorities on board also score higher ratings in corporate 
transparency.88 Higher risk aversion and transparency naturally translate 
into greater compliance and ethicality. 
The predatory lending that underlaid the Great Financial Crisis created 
a natural experiment to test these principles. For example, Professors 
Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn found that financial firms with more female 
representation at the board level engaged in less subprime lending.89 
Utilizing a database of subprime lenders from the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, they matched subprime lenders with 
non-subprime lenders by size and industry and found that board 
configuration in the two sets of firms differed in statistically significant 
ways.90 Specifically, the non-subprime lenders had boards with more 
gender diversity, longer board tenure, and were less busy with other board 
seats at other firms.91 Furthermore, “[t]he greater the percentage of 
women on the board, the less likely a firm was to specialize in subprime 
lending.”92 In short, the exploitative mortgage lending underlying the 
subprime debacle may have been preventable had there been greater 
diversity on financial institution boards.93 
Another study found that gender-diverse boards navigated the risks of 
the financial crisis better. In a study of U.S. bank holding company 
 
Muller-Kahle & Krista B. Lewellyn, Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case of US Subprime 
Lenders, 19 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L REV. 405, 405 (2011) (finding that firms with diverse 
leadership did not engage in as much subprime lending as firms with homogeneous leadership); 
Ajay Palvia et al., Are Female CEOs and Chairwomen More Conservative and Risk Averse? 
Evidence from the Banking Industry During the Financial Crisis, 131 J. BUS. ETHICS 577, 592 
(2015) (finding that banks with female CEOs posed lower risk of bank failure). 
88. See, e.g., Arun Upadhyay & Hongchao Zeng, Gender and Ethnic Diversity on Boards and 
Corporate Information Environment, 67 J. BUS. RES. 2456, 2460 (2014) (finding that board 
diversity is negatively associated with corporate opacity). 
89. Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, supra note 87, at 405. 
90. The design of the study effectively addresses the problem of the direction of causation, as 
subprime lending a year in the future cannot explain board configuration in the prior year. The 
authors explain: 
[R]everse causality is less plausible, given our research design. In our empirical tests, all 
of our independent variables are collected in the year preceding the firm identified on 
the subprime list. Thus, measures for our explanatory [variables] in the earlier period 
could not have resulted from being identified as a subprime specialist in the subsequent 
period. 
Id. at 409. 
91. Id. at 412–13 (using the group decisionmaking perspective in the context of subprime 
lending to examine board of directors configuration and its influence on decisionmaking processes 
around the issue of risky subprime lending); see also id. at 409 (defining busyness as the number 
of outside board seats held by each outside director divided by the number of outside directors). 
92. Id. at 413. 
93. Id. at 405. While the study focused on U.S. lenders, another study involving European banks 
found that boards with more women incurred lower risks too. See generally Ruth Mateos de Cabo 
et al., Gender Diversity on European Banks’ Boards of Directors, 109 J. BUS. ETHICS 145 (2012). 
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performance during the financial crisis, a group of scholars at the U.S. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the primary federal regulator 
of national banks) found that when bank holding companies reached a 
“critical mass” of three female directors,94 they enjoyed superior 
financial performance during the crisis.95 Notably, during less stressful 
times the performance advantage dissipated.96 This suggests that gender-
diverse firms manage risk better than homogeneous firms.97 Other studies 
reach similar conclusions.98 
Importing heterogeneous perspectives into the firm allows businesses 
access to richer and more elaborate information which can be 
operationalized as a break on “groupthink.”99 That can thwart behavior, 
such as unethical or non-compliant behavior, that tacitly enjoys cultural 
approval based upon affinity bias.100 With respect to ethnic diversity, this 
dynamic manifestly disrupted the “groupthink” behind bubbles in 
 
94. Laura St. Claire et al., Braving the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of 
Female Board Directors on Bank Holding Company Performance 1 (Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, Economics Working Paper No. 2016-1, June 2016), 
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/occ-working-papers/2016-2013/wp2016-
1.pdf. By focusing on performance of those firms that include a critical mass of diversity, the 
authors effectively controlled for firms that pursue tokenism rather than empower diverse 
perspectives. Id. at 22 (“The magic number 3 is the tipping point at which women are taken 
seriously as board members, while a fewer number of female directors is not sufficient to overcome 
tokenism.”). To address the possibility of reverse causation, the authors lagged performance 
measurement one year after the critical mass level was reached. Id. at 16 (“This partially addresses 
reverse causality because future [performance] cannot retroactively affect the past number of 
women.”). 
95. Id. at 1 (“We conclude that during the financial crisis, controlling for financial and board 
governance characteristics, BHCs with at least three female directors braved the crisis better, 
significantly outperforming BHCs with fewer female directors, as measured by Tobin’s Q.”). 
96. Id. at 6. 
97. Id. at 24. 
98. See Hisham Farag & Chris Mallin, Board Diversity and Financial Fragility: Evidence from 
European Banks, 49 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 98 (2017) (finding that European banks with a 
critical mass of female directors displayed less financial vulnerability during the financial crisis). 
99. Diversity has been shown to enhance cognitive functioning of groups and to disrupt 
groupthink, a dynamic characterized by mindless adherence to group norms and assumptions. See 
Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance: Understanding 
Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489, 494–97 
(1999) (stating that heterogeneous boards benefit from cognitive conflict that results in a more 
thorough consideration of problems and solutions); Marlene A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The 
Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1306 (2003) (stating that “social homogeneity on 
corporate boards harms critical deliberation” and that “the best way to avoid groupthink is to 
prevent enclaves of like-minded people from making group decisions”; therefore, “reform 
proposals should discourage groupthink by promoting more diversity on boards in terms of gender, 
race, class, ethnicity, age, national origin, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic background, as 
well as expertise and temperament”). 
100. See Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PROC. NAT’L 
ACAD. SCI. 18524, 18524 (2014) (“Our results suggest that bubbles are affected by a property of 
the collectivity of market traders—ethnic homogeneity.”). 
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experimental markets.101 According to the authors: 
We find that price bubbles are fueled by the ethnic homogeneity of 
traders. Homogeneity, we suggest, imbues people with false confidence 
in the judgment of coethnics, discouraging them from scrutinizing 
behavior. In contrast, traders in diverse markets reliably price assets 
closer to true values. They are less likely to accept inflated offers and 
more likely to accept offers that are closer to true value, thereby 
thwarting bubbles. This pattern is similar in Southeast Asia and North 
America, even if the two sites differ greatly in culture and ethnic 
composition, in what is implied by “ethnic diversity” and how it is 
operationalized.102 
This is the central element in the diversity advantage: it disrupts the 
“groupthink” dynamic that drives all systemic unethical and non-
compliant behavior.103 This disruption of “groupthink” supplements the 
efforts of the firm to acclimate to diverse key constituencies.104 
In the end, business is not so concerned about always reaching the 
objectively right answer in terms of some universally accepted truth.105 
Instead, business seeks merely to maximize shareholder wealth through 
 
101. Id. at 18527 (“[T]raders in diverse markets reliably price assets closer to true values. They 
are less likely to accept inflated offers and more likely to accept offers closer to true value, thereby 
thwarting bubbles.”). 
102. Id. The results are based upon 2,022 transactions by 180 traders in thirty different 
markets—fourteen diverse and sixteen homogeneous. Id. The market with the lowest accuracy was 
the homogeneous market in North America—i.e., the market with all white traders. Id. 
103. E.g., supra notes 3, 13 and 20. 
104. E.g., supra notes 79–88. 
105. From a business perspective, the deep uncertainty regarding objectively verifiable ethical 
norms must give way to the putative mission of the business corporation to maximize shareholder 
wealth. Corporate law only rarely, at best, enforces the norm that the business corporation be 
operated for the purpose of shareholder wealth maximization. See LYNN A. STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, 
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 10 (2012) (demonstrating that the law fails to back up 
shareholder primacy). Instead, as discussed above, the law has taken decisively anti-shareholder 
and pro-management turns. See supra notes 30 and 53. Restoration of shareholder primacy, in terms 
of public corporations where legal protections are needed to assure shareholder prerogatives are 
preserved notwithstanding diffused ownership, would fully vindicate the federal purpose for 
regulation of public firms. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2014). More specifically, Congress enacted the 
federal securities laws because trading in shares could create “[n]ational emergencies, which 
produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and 
which burden interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare.” Id. Such emergencies 
are “precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable 
fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to 
meet such emergencies the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to burden the 
national credit.” Id. This amounts to a federal mandate to protect investors, not speculators who are 
ancillary to the primary purpose of the federal securities laws. In short, shareholder primacy may 
be assumed for private firms and assumed as part of the investor protection mandate under the 
federal securities laws for public firms. State corporate law, particularly in Delaware, and the war 
against private securities litigation is the genesis of CEO primacy and all the problems that entails. 
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optimal acclimation to all important constituents.106 Observing ethical 
standards beyond law that achieves such acclimation depends upon 
principles of sound risk management.107 Risk management entails 
mechanisms and systems within the firm to assure that all risks are 
identified and assessed across the enterprise, rather than allowing risks to 
fester in any risk silo.108 Once a firm achieves that goal, the firm can 
rationalize its risks in accordance with its risk policy and its disclosures 
to shareholders.109 This approach to risk management paid off during the 
subprime debacle.110 
These same principles support the concept that there should be no 
ethics or compliance silo. Thus, a culturally diverse ethical and 
compliance screening function or team can either conceptualize ethics 
and compliance outcomes better than a homogeneous team or assess the 
varying risks associated with such conceptualization in a superior way to 
achieve an advantage over a homogeneous screening mechanism. 
Culturally diverse teams both conceptualize ethics better and manage risk 
better. The combined effect of these two elements yields positive 
outcomes with respect to ethical and compliance outcomes.111 
 
106. See Amy J. Hillman & Gerald D. Keim, Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Management, 
and Social Issues: What’s the Bottom Line?, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 125, 125 (2001) (suggesting 
that “[b]uilding better relations with primary stakeholders like employees, customers, suppliers, 
and communities could lead to increased shareholder wealth by helping firms develop intangible, 
valuable assets which can be sources of competitive advantage” and testing this proposition with 
data from the performance of S&P 500 firms and concluding that “stakeholder management leads 
to improved shareholder value, while [mere] social issue participation is negatively associated with 
shareholder value”). 
107. See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, American Corporate Governance and Enterprise 
Risk Management, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 572 (2008) (concluding that “enterprise-wide risk 
management [ERM] can enhance the functioning of the corporation as well as the ability of capital 
markets to respond to risk, but that the current legal framework fails to facilitate this process” and 
suggesting that “disclosure requirements with respect to risk management would encourage 
superior transparency and management within the public corporation”). 
108. Id. at 581 (“Currently, many organizations still continue to address risk in ‘silos,’ with the 
management of . . . risks each conducted as narrowly focused and fragmented activities,” but 
enterprise-wide risk management views “all risk areas . . . as parts of an integrated, strategic, and 
enterprise-wide system. While risk management is coordinated with senior-level oversight, 
employees at all levels of the organization using ERM are encouraged to view risk management as 
an integral and ongoing part of their jobs.”). 
109. Id. at 581–82 (quoting COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY 
COMMISSION, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT–INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK 2 (2004), 
http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSOERMExecutiveSummary.pdf). 
110. Vincent Aebi et al., Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank Performance in 
the Financial Crisis, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 3213 (2012) (finding that banks with a more 
independent risk management function outperformed other banks during the financial crisis). 
111. For example, scholars found that firms with female leadership suffered fewer allegations 
of fraud and more conservative accounting. See generally Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Female Board 
Presence and the Likelihood of Financial Restatement, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 607, 626 (2012) 
(“Using a matched-pair sample of restatement and control firms, we conducted conditional logistic 
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III.  DISCLOSING THE GOVERNANCE OF ETHICALITY AND COMPLIANCE 
In the past, I urged public firms that took ethics and compliance 
seriously to form independent committees of the board with legal 
expertise to manage compliance and legal and reputational risk.112 More 
specifically, I proposed an independent committee of the board composed 
entirely of lawyers that would function to receive reports of wrongdoing 
within the firm (including anonymous reports) and to conduct an annual 
legal compliance audit.113 Much of my proposal found its roots in the 
SEC’s innovation of the Qualified Legal Compliance Committee 
(“QLCC”). The SEC created the concept of the QLCC based upon the 
directions of Congress to promulgate regulations implementing new rules 
governing the professional responsibility of counsel appearing before the 
Commission in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).114 SOX itself 
embodied Congress’ response to the failure of Enron, WorldCom, and a 
series of similar corporate governance and accounting failures in 2001–
2002, and the legislative determination that ethics mattered.115 
The whole point of the SEC in creating the QLCC (and Congress in 
passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) was that ethics and compliance mattered 
to the investing public.116 In addition, Congress mandated that publicly 
traded firms adopt an ethics code or explain to their investors why they 
declined to impose ethical mandates upon their firm’s business 
conduct.117 This constituted a clear indication that both Congress and the 
SEC found ethics and compliance material subject to mandatory 
 
regressions comparing the characteristics of restatement and control firms. Briefly, we find a 
significant reduction in the likelihood of financial restatement and the presence of at least one 
female board director.”); Douglas Cumming et al., Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud, 58 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1572, 1573 (2015) (“Our evidence shows that gender diversity reduces the 
likelihood of being in our fraud sample and reduces the severity of the fraud.”); Simon S.M. Ho et 
al., CEO Gender, Ethical Leadership, and Accounting Conservatism, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 351, 366 
(2015) (“[R]egardless of the measure of . . . conservatism, we find consistent evidence that 
companies led by female CEOs report earnings more conservatively.”); Mary Jane Lenard et al., 
Female Business Leaders and the Incidence of Fraud Litigation, 43 MANAGERIAL FIN. 59 (2017). 
112. Ramirez, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 27, at 351–67. 
113. Id. at 362–63. 
114. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as 
amended at scattered provisions of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is often 
referred to as “SOX.” 
115. The Good, the Bad and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the 
Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2126–27 (2003) (“Arguably 
the most far-reaching corporate reform legislation since the [federal securities laws of 1933 and 
1934], [SOX] was designed to increase the transparency, integrity, and accountability of public 
companies and, in turn, to combat the kind of corporate deceit that had given rise to the scandals 
and financial breakdowns.”). 
116. See supra notes 29, 31 and 32. 
117. See supra notes 29 and 31. 
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disclosure under the federal securities laws after the Enron series of 
corporate scandals. 
The SEC exemplified the kind of disclosure guidance needed with the 
guidance it furnished with respect to the costs of climate change.118 It 
essentially requires every publicly traded firm to disclose material facts 
regarding the impact of climate change (including potential governmental 
action) upon its business.119 The SEC noted that some industries, such as 
the insurance industry, already seek to adjust to climate change and the 
financial exposures it may entail.120 By encouraging firms to disclose 
such matters, the SEC uses financial markets to force publicly traded 
firms to reckon with, and rationalize their approach to, all future costs 
and benefits121 that firms may face from this source of risk.122 Simply 
stated, market competition for a lower cost of capital (an item which 
affects CEO compensation through options compensation)123 will cause 
 
118. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 
6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, and 241) (“This release outlines our 
views with respect to our existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change matters. 
This guidance is intended to assist companies in satisfying their disclosure obligations under the 
federal securities laws and regulations.”). 
119. Id. 
120. As the SEC stated: 
The insurance industry is already adjusting to these developments. A 2008 study listed 
climate change as the number one risk facing the insurance industry. Reflecting this 
assessment, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners recently promulgated 
a uniform standard for mandatory disclosure by insurance companies to state regulators 
of financial risks due to climate change and actions taken to mitigate them. We 
understand that insurance companies are developing new actuarial models and designing 
new products to reshape coverage for green buildings, renewable energy, carbon risk 
management and directors’ and officers’ liability, among other actions. 
Id. at 6291. 
121. Overall, climate change entails risk, but like all risks some may intelligently manage it for 
profit: 
New trading markets for emission credits related to ‘‘cap and trade’’ programs that might 
be established under pending legislation, if adopted, could present new opportunities for 
investment. These markets also could allow companies that have more allowances than 
they need, or that can earn offset credits through their businesses, to raise revenue 
through selling these instruments into those markets. Some companies might suffer 
financially if these or similar bills are enacted by the Congress while others could benefit 
by taking advantage of new business opportunities. 
Id. 
122. See generally Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and the Economics of a Carbon Tax 
(forthcoming 2018) (showing that climate change will prove to be the most dramatic economic 
disruption in human history). 
123. In considering sound corporate governance proposals, scholars must consider the impact 
of any proposal upon CEOs first and foremost since corporate governance grants CEOs a very high 
level of autonomy to further their own interests at the expense of shareholders. See Steven A. 
Ramirez, The End of Corporate Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to 
the Top, 24 YALE J. REG. 314 (2007). 
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firms to reduce climate-change costs and maximize climate-change 
opportunities.124 
Another instance of the SEC clarifying disclosure obligations under 
the federal securities laws came in the immediate aftermath of the Great 
Financial Crisis.125 The SEC acted because shareholders demanded more 
information about the leadership of public firms, and the SEC’s action 
seemed tailored to emerging management lapses from the subprime 
debacle.126 Significantly, the SEC imposed disclosure obligations 
relating to the governance of risk management for every public firm and 
the degree to which the risk management function operated 
independently of the CEO and other managerial officers.127 Similarly, the 
SEC imposed disclosure obligations upon publicly traded firms to inform 
shareholders of the role diversity plays in the selection of directors, 
whether the firm applies any policy to the issue of diversity in the 
boardroom, and to describe any such policy.128 The SEC thus already 
 
124. See supra notes 118–122. 
125. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, and 274) (requiring registrants to disclose, inter alia: 
“compensation policies and practices that present material risks to the company; stock and option 
awards of executives and directors; director and nominee qualifications and legal proceedings; 
board leadership structure; [and] the board’s role in risk oversight”). 
126. Id. (“[I]nvestors have increasingly focused on corporate accountability and have expressed 
the desire for additional information that would enhance their ability to make informed voting and 
investment decisions.”). By late 2009, manifest managerial lapses played a leading role in 
understanding all phases of the subprime debacle and scholars set out to prove that corporate 
governance law and regulation failed to adequately reign in CEO autonomy in particular. See 
Steven A. Ramirez, Lessons from the Subprime Debacle: Stress Testing CEO Autonomy, 54 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 53–54 (2009) (“CEOs are the new potentates, with power to crash global capitalism 
and rake in millions for the favor. The rule of law must reassert itself. CEO power to . . . manipulate 
risk, to stack the board with their own clones, and to skirt legal compliance must be diminished.”). 
127. The SEC suggested: 
[D]isclosure about the board’s involvement in the oversight of the risk management 
process should provide important information to investors about how a company 
perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the board and senior 
management in managing the material risks facing the company. This disclosure 
requirement gives companies the flexibility to describe how the board administers its 
risk oversight function, such as through the whole board, or through a separate risk 
committee or the audit committee, for example. Where relevant, companies may want to 
address whether the individuals who supervise the day-to-day risk management 
responsibilities report directly to the board as a whole or to a board committee or how 
the board or committee otherwise receives information from such individuals. 
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,345. The foregoing discussion operates 
effectively as disclosure guidance, as the final rule only states: “disclose the extent of the board’s 
role in the risk oversight of the registrant, such as how the board administers its oversight function, 
and the effect that this has on the board’s leadership structure.” Id. at 38,635 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 
229.407(h) (2010)). 
128. The Commission did not even attempt to define diversity, opting instead to allow firms 
and financial markets to sort it out: 
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holds experience and expertise with respect to mandating the disclosure 
of corporate governance structures and the role diversity plays in those 
structures. 
This all applies to the governing structures of ethicality, reputational 
risk management, and compliance risk management within publicly 
traded firms. The degree to which the firm deploys cultural diversity to 
vet such issues should be disclosed to investors given the evidence in Part 
II of this Article regarding the important role diversity can play in 
compliance and ethical outcomes.129 The independence from 
management that the firm uses to address such issues, the expertise the 
firm brings to a given issue, and the degree to which the firm enlists 
outside consultants or attorneys to advise it with respect to such issues 
may all play a material role in a reasonable investor’s investment 
decision, particularly in light of the manifest costs of mismanaging such 
risks as recounted in Part I of this Article.130 Similarly, whether the firm 
allows compliance issues to fester in risk silos or takes affirmative action 
to assure such risks come out of the shadows of the firm (by, for example, 
implementing anonymous hotlines or incentives for whistleblowing) can 
also play a role in investment decisions.131 Finally, forcing firms to either 
 
We recognize that companies may define diversity in various ways, reflecting different 
perspectives. For instance, some companies may conceptualize diversity expansively to 
include differences of viewpoint, professional experience, education, skill and other 
individual qualities and attributes that contribute to board heterogeneity, while others 
may focus on diversity concepts such as race, gender and national origin. We believe 
that for purposes of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to define 
diversity in ways that they consider appropriate. As a result we have not defined diversity 
in the amendments. 
Id. at 68,344. The new rule provides only that firms describe the role of diversity: “Describe the 
nominating committee’s process for identifying and evaluating nominees for director . . . and 
whether, and if so how, the nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying 
nominees for director.” Id. at 68,364 (quoting 17 C.F.R.§ 229.407(c)(ii)(7) (2010)). The rule also 
requires disclosure of any policy governing this process. Id. 
129. Supra Part II. 
130. Professor Langevoort summarizes the learning on the basic contours of a sound 
compliance function, which can be extended to include an ethics function: 
The common structural framework includes (1) a commitment from senior leadership to 
the task, setting a right “tone at the top;” (2) delegation of authority to officials with 
distinct compliance responsibilities and the resources to do their task; (3) firm-wide 
education and training about both the substance and process of compliance; (4) 
informational mechanisms to alert as to suspicious activity (e.g., whistleblowing 
procedures); (5) audit and surveillance tactics to detect compliance failures or risks; and 
(6) internal investigation, response, discipline and remediation so as to learn and adjust 
when failures occur. By most accounts, the right mix of these is firm-specific, a 
customization that recognizes the great range of motives, opportunities and types of 
violations most likely to be a problem at a given firm. 
Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 939–40 (2017). 
131. Id. 
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adopt QLCCs or explain the lack of such a compliance function also can 
furnish material information to the investing public.132 Those firms adept 
at managing ethicality, reputational, and compliance risk can and should 
enjoy a lower cost of capital because shareholders would be equipped to 
avert at least some of the most catastrophic losses.133 Taking these steps 
could truly align the interests of management enjoying options 
compensation arrangements with equity investors, as Congress intended 
the federal securities laws to operate. 
The scope of this Article does not include the precise contours of the 
disclosure guidance the SEC should issue. Instead, this Article focuses 
on establishing the materiality of ethicality and compliance governance 
structure and the critical and more rigorous role cultural diversity may 
play in a well-ordered system of ethics and compliance risk 
management.134 Moreover, different firms in different sectors may find 
that different governing structures make sense given their operating 
environment and other institutional structures, such as compensation 
practices.135 Indeed, encouraging experimentation with the most 
efficacious governing structures could well emerge as a major benefit of 
deeming ethics, compliance, and reputation risk management structures 
material.136 Investors simply enjoy an entitlement to disclosure of 
manifestly material facts, such as how the firms govern and control (or 
do not control) the manifest risks of unethical and non-compliant 
behavior. 
The SEC should keep in mind, moreover, that a failure to issue 
disclosure guidance (as argued above) will only operate to shift the issues 
to the courts. Such a process could create decades of uncertainty among 
public firms and impose large litigation costs as courts wrestle with issues 
relating to the precise contours of the disclosure obligations firms face.137 
While the possibility that the courts will address the issue in a decidedly 
pro-CEO way definitely looms, if the courts simply discount the 
importance of ethics and compliance, they will essentially assume 
complicity with CEOs in the continuing unethical and fraudulent 
 
132. No such disclosure obligation currently exists. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(k) and 205.3(c) 
(2017). 
133. See supra notes 5, 14 and 19. 
134. See supra notes 27 and 32. 
135. Langevoort, supra note 130, at 939–40. 
136. Id. 
137. See JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORM IN THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 61 (2010) (discussing the complex topic of 
corporate officers’ fiduciary duties to their shareholders and how the court historically struggled to 
evaluate these claims, leading to a significant waste of judicial resources). 
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practices that plague the U.S. business sector.138 Furthermore, many 
courts may well comprehend the social benefits for all, and for all 
shareholders in particular, of a more ethical and compliant corporate 
sector. Very few judges benefited from the historic collapse of capitalism 
during the Great Financial Crisis and the trillions expended by the 
government to rescue the corrupt financial sector.139 Even today, the 
emergence of a new precariat arising from the ashes of the Great 
Financial Crisis threatens core American values and seemingly tolerates 
even the most virulent degrees of corruption.140 The unbridled conduct 
occurring within the corporate sector threatens the rule of law and social 
stability. 
Private securities litigation could, in other words, impose 
accountability on the corporate sector as well as CEOs notwithstanding 
the recalcitrance of the SEC.141 Private securities litigation constitutes a 
depoliticized form of law and regulation that typically cannot suffer 
corruption from high economic inequality and the campaign 
contributions, lobbying efforts, and job offers that invariably follow in its 
wake.142 Moreover, private securities litigation makes no claim on 
taxpayer resources nor entails any new government bureaucracy.143 
Private enforcement for securities fraud squares with even the most 
austere notions of libertarian ideals for the role of government.144 It also 
serves the interests of the investing public by forcing fraudfeasors to 
repay their victims.145 For all the reasons above, in favor of the SEC 
deeming material and thus mandating disclosure of ethics, compliance, 
and reputational risk management structures within the firm, courts 
should also not hesitate to impose such disclosure requirements upon 
public firms in the absence of SEC guidance.146 Indeed, by deeming 
ethics and compliance systems material, the courts would essentially 
vindicate all underlying legal and regulatory policies favoring a sound 
system of regulated capitalism. 
 
138. See Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption and the Complicity of Congress and the 
Supreme Court – The Tortuous Path from Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 131 (2009) (stating “[t]his article asserts that Congress and the federal courts 
are complicit in the widespread corporate corruption that has come to light this past decade”). 
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Whether accomplished through the SEC or the judiciary, the disclosure 
of the precise contours of how a firm manages ethical and compliance 
risk plays a material factor not just in shareholder returns, but in 
macroeconomic performance too.147 The essential purpose of the federal 
securities laws is to stabilize and secure credit markets and, by extension, 
investment, as demonstrated in Section 2 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934.148 It is axiomatic that plunging investment drove the Great 
 
147. Joseph P. Kennedy attributed the Great Depression to pervasive unethical behavior. 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 423 (1958) (implicating 
“practically all the important names in the financial community in practices which, to say the least, 
were highly unethical”). 
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funds related thereto, and to impose requirements necessary to make such regulation and 
control reasonably complete and effective, in order to protect interstate commerce, the 
national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and make more effective the national 
banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and 
honest markets in such transactions: (1) Such transactions (a) are carried on in large volume 
by the public generally and in large part originate outside the States in which the exchanges 
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bank loans. (3) Frequently the prices of securities on such exchanges and markets are 
susceptible to manipulation and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives rise to 
excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctuations in the prices of 
securities which (a) cause alternately unreasonable expansion and unreasonable contraction 
of the volume of credit available for trade, transportation, and industry in interstate 
commerce, (b) hinder the proper appraisal of the value of securities and thus prevent a fair 
calculation of taxes owing to the United States and to the several States by owners, buyers, 
and sellers of securities, and (c) prevent the fair valuation of collateral for bank loans and/or 
obstruct the effective operation of the national banking system and Federal Reserve System. 
(4) National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation of 
trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and adversely 
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sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such 
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Depression as well as the recession of 2008.149 In both instances, deep 
and fundamental lapses in basic ethics and legal compliance drove the 
economic contraction. Securing a stable credit and investment 
environment through enhanced disclosure of ethics and compliance is 
therefore consistent with the longstanding goals of the federal securities 
laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Enhanced ethics and compliance will serve shareholders well, 
particularly in an era of diminished regulation. Demanding that ethical 
and compliance governance systems be deemed material will create 
market pressure and accountability on firm managers for superior extra-
legal outcomes and compliance outcomes. Businesses that use cultural 
diversity to screen their business conduct within the framework of 
shareholder primacy will better acclimate themselves to all key 
constituencies and achieve objective ethical and compliance results. 
Given the increased diversity of consumer, labor, and investor pools, this 
approach to encouraging extra-legal standards of conduct draws upon 
differences in ethical sensitivities to drive more rigorous ethical screening 
of business conduct. Further, to the extent that the business enterprise 
enhances its financial performance through a more diverse screening 
mechanism, it should lead to quantifiable gains over those firms that do 
not feature such an innovation. Firms will attract persons spanning the 
breadth of cultural diversity to do business with the firm, and pay less in 
fines. Ultimately, the optimal structure for corporate ethical and 
compliance screening should emerge to give shareholders enhanced 
value as the firm achieves greater acclimation among constituencies. 
Competitive pressure can thereby enhance firm ethicality and investors 
can thereby objectively measure firm ethicality. The SEC should 
facilitate this process of discovery of optimal ethical and compliance 
structures within the firm through the issuance of disclosure guidance of 
ethical and compliance structures within public firms. Such structures 
will prove material to investors, and the disclosure of such material facts 
vindicate the underlying macroeconomic purpose of the federal securities 
laws. 
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